Over the past week, cyber activity tied to the regional escalation has accelerated at a pace and intensity that’s different from previous escalations. While some patterns mirror earlier conflict cycles, several new dynamics are shaping the threat landscape in ways Gulf organizations need to understand and prepare for.  Below is a summary of what’s changed, what’s actually showing up on networks, and who’s most at risk.

What Changed and Why it Matters

  • A rapid spike in hacktivist operations and expanding alliances. 

    Multiple independent reports show hacktivist groups sharply ramping up website defacements, DDoS activity, and “hack‑and‑leak” claims following the joint U.S.–Israeli strikes on Feb 28 [1]2 ,3
    At the same time, pro‑Iran hacktivist groups have re‑emerged and are forming new alliances. Long‑active Iranian‑aligned actors are now coordinating with pro‑Russia groups, including NoName057, as well as Palestinian and even some China‑linked collectives. This is resulting in more synchronized, multi‑group operations than in previous cycles.

  • Fewer large, attributable APT operations (for now)

    Analysts note that state‑sponsored activity has been comparatively muted during the initial days of the crisis, with many public claims still unverified [1].

     

  • Iran’s domestic internet blackout constrained early coordination

    Near‑zero internal connectivity in Iran blunted short‑term coordination for more complex operations and reduced visibility into actor orchestration [3].

  • The U.S. publicly signaled its own cyber posture

    Pentagon briefings identified U.S. Cyber Command and Space Command as “first movers,” underscoring that offensive cyber capabilities are fully integrated with the kinetic environment in this conflict [4].

 

What We’re Seeing Behind the Scenes

While there are some similarities between what's unfolding in the Gulf and what happened in Ukraine, the cyber operations in the Gulf are significantly more sophisticated and go well beyond traditional DDoS disruption. In Ukraine, attacks were heavily centered on disruptions, designed to interrupt critical services. Whereas in the Gulf, the threats extend far past simple disruption with attackers increasingly exploiting vulnerabilities in web applications and APIs to steal data, leak it publicly, and gain deeper access for follow‑on actions. The intent is not only to degrade services but to intentionally create fear and erode public trust.

  • Rising reconnaissance — a precursor to larger attacks

    A clear spike in scanning and probing mirrors patterns observed in the Ukraine conflict and strongly suggests preparation for more sophisticated operations, including data theft, destructive tooling, or deeper intrusions.
  • DDoS surges — especially at the application layer

    DDoS attacks remain a critical threat vector.  Expect multi‑vector campaigns and high‑intensity HTTPS‑layer floods, often run by cross‑group coalitions to maximize “loud,” visible impact [5][6].

  • “Hack‑and‑leak” and web/app/API targeting

    Iran‑linked operators and affiliated hacktivists continue to exploit exposed web services and APIs, steal data, and amplify it across social and media channels [7]. They also attempt to compromise web applications to inject malware or remote management tools, enabling persistence and deeper network access.  

  • Fear as an operational objective

    These campaigns intentionally seek societal disruption, not just service downtime. Actors combine public data leaks, misinformation, and targeting of high‑visibility systems (e.g., airport operational platforms) to create fear and uncertainty, undermine public confidence, and amplify geopolitical impact. Attackers want their activity to be seen, reported, and shared, as visibility itself adds pressure and contributes to disruption.

  • Identity attacks and VIP account takeovers

    Recent HANDALA‑linked activity shows attackers can compromise messaging‑app sessions (e.g., Telegram) to obtain contact graphs and partial chat content without needing full device compromise—still enough to cause reputational and intelligence impact [8][9].

  • Destructive tooling remains active in the ecosystem

    Research teams have documented HANDALA‑branded wipers using AutoIT loaders and Telegram‑based C2 channels—capabilities that could re‑emerge alongside broader information operations [10].

  • Cross‑actor teaming and claim amplification

    #OpIsrael‑aligned operations continue to exhibit loose collaboration between pro‑Iran and pro‑Russia hacktivists, merging DDoS activity with data‑exfiltration narratives [11].

 

Who's Most at Risk Right Now?

Attackers are primarily focusing on critical infrastructure and essential service sectors. Targets that, if disrupted, have outsized societal and geopolitical impact:

  • Energy & critical infrastructure

    Routinely identified as top‑priority targets during regional escalations and prominently featured in current threat narratives [1][2]. This includes electricity grids, power companies, and water treatment facilities.

  • Telecom & internet services

    Iran’s blackout and broader regional cyber operations have elevated connectivity infrastructure as a strategic focal point [3].

  • Finance & payments

    Financial services and payment platforms continue to appear frequently in warning reports and targeting discussions [2].

  • Logistics & transportation

    Historical and current reporting highlights opportunistic attempts to disrupt - or claim the disruption of - shipping, port logistics, and air‑cargo‑related systems [2][4].

  • Healthcare

    Example: The HANDALA group claimed a breach of Clalit, Israel’s largest healthcare provider; the incident is still under investigation and should be treated as unconfirmed until validated [12][13].

     

Next Steps

The situation in the Gulf is evolving quickly, with attacks designed to create uncertainty and pressure,  not just downtime. Adversaries are intentionally going after trust and visibility, pushing organizations into a reactive posture and exposing weaknesses in their cyber resilience. To understand what your organization can do right now to stay protected, continue to Part 2 of this series. You’ll find a clear, practical guide outlining the specific steps your team can take today to strengthen defenses and stay ahead of the threat. 

 

Read Next: Practical Guide & Action Plan

 

 

 

Sources

[1] SecurityWeek – “Iran Cyber Front: Hacktivist Activity Rises, but State‑Sponsored Attacks Stay Low” (Mar 3, 2026): https://www.securityweek.com/iran-cyber-front-hacktivist-activity-rises-but-state-sponsored-attacks-stay-low/

[2] Cybersecurity Dive – “Iran‑linked hackers raise threat level against US, allies” (Mar 2, 2026): https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/iran-hackers-threat-level-us-allies/813494/

[3] CNBC – “Iran’s internet blackout enters fourth day amid reports of cyberattacks” (Mar 2–3, 2026): https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/02/irans-internet-down-amid-reports-of-us-israel-cyberattacks.html

[4] The Register – “Top general spotlights cyber role in Iran conflict” (Mar 3, 2026): https://www.theregister.com/2026/03/03/cyberwarriors_us_iran_war/

[5] NSFOCUS – 2024 Global DDoS Landscape (Jun 9, 2025): https://nsfocusglobal.com/nsfocus-releases-2024-global-ddos-landscape-report/

[6] NSFOCUS – “Modern DDoS Attacks and the Rise of DDoS Coalitions” (Apr 2, 2024): https://nsfocusglobal.com/modern-ddos-attacks-and-the-rise-of-ddos-coalitions/

[7] Check Point Research – “What Defenders Need to Know about Iran’s Cyber Capabilities” (Mar 1, 2026): https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/what-defenders-need-to-know-about-irans-cyber-capabilities/

[8] KELA – “The Handala Hack: Telegram account breaches of Israeli officials” (Jan 2026): https://www.kelacyber.com/blog/handala-hack-telegram-breach-israeli-officials/

[9] The Times of Israel – “Bennett admits Iranian hackers accessed his Telegram account, says phone not breached” (Dec 17, 2025): https://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-denies-his-phone-was-hacked-after-iranian-group-claims-to-leak-its-contents/

[10] Splunk/Talos – “Handala’s Wiper: Threat Analysis and Detections” (Jul 2024): https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/handalas-wiper-threat-analysis-and-detections.html

[11] Cybersecurity Dive – “Pro‑Russia actors team with Iran‑linked hackers in attacks” (Mar 3, 2026): https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/pro-russia-actors-support-iran-nexus-hackers/813647/

[12] The Jerusalem Post – “Iran‑linked hacker group claims it hacked Clalit servers” (Feb 25, 2026): https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-887911

[13] Israel National News – “Suspected cyber hack at Clalit Health Services” (Feb 25, 2026): https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/422970